The Paradoxes of Reference

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.15421/272004

Abstract

The aporia and paradoxes of the reference theory of meaning are considered. The latter can be considered as the most universal and heuristically valuable construction, taking into account all possible situations of language interaction. A fundamentally important task is to unite in the framework of one theory both the semantic and communicative aspects of reference. It is shown that in the process of reference there is a semantic coincidence of ontological structures and epistemological procedures, that only such a combination can clarify the true meaning of using the language.

The relevance of the chosen topic is due to the growing need to combine the conceptual apparatus of heterogeneous semantic theories into a coherent whole and to resolve the difficulties and paradoxes that arise in connection with attempts to build a unified theory of meaning.

We formulate the main paradoxes of reference:

  1. The intent of the creator of the mark is necessary for the implementation of the reference, but the recipient is able to read and understand the mark, not taking into account the intent of its creator.
  2. The more real we consider an object; the less ontological transparency it possesses. Or, the most obvious reference to an object produces (reveals) the least obvious conditions for the existence of a given object.
  3. The third paradox can be considered the implementation and recognition of the implementation of reference in a language that I do not know. Reference to an unknown object.
  4. The fourth paradox (aporia): a picture lying in the basement, or a text that no one will ever read and understand (Borges' Babylonian Library), also carry out a reference. By whom? A reference carried out without a subject. To find out that a name refers to something and to understand how we discover it (epistemological question) – this also means to understand how the name as something refers to something (ontological question). Our operations with words are necessary for names to mean something, i.e. sent to something. Although many unknown names may refer people to something that they have no idea. When do we discover this? Firstly, every time you meet names whose objects are unclear or not given, but only possible. Secondly, nonsense.

This essay is only the first experience in relation to the universal and at the same time pragmatic theory of reference. The difficulties described here are not only and not so much obstacles along the way, but the key points in which our thought is forced to return to itself and its own foundations.

Published

2021-02-04