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THE ALGORITHMIC INTERPRETANT AS A TRANSFORMATIVE FACTOR IN THE COMMUNICATIVE SPACE OF DIGITAL CULTURE

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Abstract. This article undertakes a philosophical inquiry into the transformation of communicative space in the context of digital culture. **Introduction.** In contemporary society, digital culture has become not only the dominant mode of interaction but also a decisive factor in reshaping the social, cultural and epistemological environment. Digital communication alters not merely the technical conditions of information transfer, but the very ontology of dialogue, representation and interpretation. Algorithmic mediation, the emergence of a «semiotics of surface» and the loss of context generate new challenges for the ethics of dialogue, the structure of publicity and the capacity

for critical thought. The urgency of this topic stems both from the speed of technological change and from the philosophical depth of the problems it provokes. **Aim of the study.** The purpose of the article is to analyse the transformation of communicative space under digital culture through three interconnected levels: the communicative (the reconfiguration of dialogical ethics), the semiotic (the transformation of sign and representation) and the epistemological-ethical (critical thinking as a response to algorithmic mediation). The objective is to reveal the structural shifts that affect communication, representation and interpretation, and to formulate philosophical foundations for their systematic understanding. **Methods.** Methodologically, the study draws upon hermeneutical analysis, phenomenological reconstruction of communicative experience and critical reflection on the epistemological consequences of digital representation. This interdisciplinary framework allows the integration of classical concepts from philosophy of communication with contemporary debates in media theory and digital semiotics. **Scientific novelty.** The article proposes a conceptual model for the philosophical interpretation of digital communication as a transformation that is not only technical but ontological. For the first time, the synthesis of communication philosophy, the semiotics of the technical image and the ethics of critical thought is developed within a unified theoretical field. A key contribution is the introduction of the concept of the «algorithmic interpretant»: a mechanism by which algorithms replace the human function of interpretation through ranking, classification and filtering of signs. This idea provides a bridge between semiotics, critical theory and the study of digital infrastructures. **Main results.** The findings demonstrate that digital media reshape the ontological structure of communication: algorithms displace intentions, surfaces replace depth, and reaction substitutes for understanding. Within the semiotic dimension, the sign is no longer primarily a bearer of meaning but functions as a calculable element within algorithmic systems, undermining classical interpretative models. The philosophies of Vilém Flusser and Jean Baudrillard help to illuminate this transition from hermeneutics to simulation, from meaning to effect. In this context, critical thinking acquires the status of an ethical response to algorithmic logics that privilege visibility, immediacy and quantification over reflection and depth. **Conclusions.** The transformation of communicative space under digital culture demands a rethinking of the philosophical premises of dialogue, representation and interpretation. Digital media modify not only modes of interaction but the ontological nature of public communication itself, fragmenting contexts and redefining agency. Philosophy of communication in the digital age must therefore serve not only an analytic role but also an ethical one, offering tools for navigation within algorithmically mediated culture. Critical thinking, interpretation and contextualisation emerge as forms of ethical resistance to superficiality, reactivity and the loss of meaning. Future research may focus on exploring the epistemological limits of algorithmic communication and its implications for higher education, the public sphere and institutions of knowledge.

Keywords: digital communication, semiotics, representation, algorithm, critical thinking, dialogical ethics, media philosophy.

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АЛГОРИТМІЧНИЙ ІНТЕРПРЕТАНТ ЯК ЧИННИК ТРАНСФОРМАЦІЇ КОМУНІКАТИВНОГО ПРОСТОРУ ЦИФРОВОЇ КУЛЬТУРИ

Анотація. У статті здійснено філософське осмислення трансформації комунікативного простору в умовах цифрової культури. Сучасна цифрова культура змінює не лише технічні засоби передачі інформації, а й саму природу комунікації, репрезентації та інтерпретації. Алгоритмічне посередництво, семіотика поверхні та втрата контексту ставлять нові виклики перед етикою діалогу й здатністю до критичного мислення. **Мета дослідження** полягає у філософському аналізі трансформації комунікативного простору через три взаємопов'язані рівні: комунікативний (зміна етики діалогу), семіотичний (трансформація знаку й репрезентації) та епістемологічно-етичний (критичне мислення як відповідь на алгоритмічне посередництво). Дослідження спирається на **методи** герменевтичного аналізу, феноменологічну реконструкцію досвіду комунікації та критичну рефлексію щодо епістемологічних наслідків цифрової репрезентації. Такий підхід дозволяє інтегрувати класичні концепти з новими викликами цифрової культури. **Наукова новизна.**

Уперше здійснено синтез філософії комунікації, семіотики технічного образу та етики критичного мислення в єдиній теоретичній рамці. У статті вводиться поняття «алгоритмічний інтерпретант» технічного механізму, який заміщує людську функцію інтерпретації шляхом ранжування, класифікації та фільтрації знаків. **Основні результати.** Показано, що цифрові медіа змінюють онтологічну структуру комунікації: алгоритми витісняють інтенції, поверхня замінює глибину, а реакція – розуміння. У семіотичному вимірі знак перетворюється на елемент обчислюваної системи, що ставить під сумнів класичні моделі інтерпретації. Критичне мислення постає як етична відповідь на алгоритмізовану логіку цифрової публічності. **Висновки.** Філософія комунікації в цифрову епоху має виконувати не лише теоретико-аналітичну, а й етико-навігаційну функцію. Подальші дослідження можуть бути спрямовані на аналіз меж алгоритмізованої комунікації та її впливу на гуманітарну освіту, публічну сферу й інститути знання.

Ключові слова: цифрова комунікація, семіотика, репрезентація, алгоритм, критичне мислення, етика діалогу, філософія медіа.

Problem statement. In the contemporary world, digital communication has become not only the dominant mode of interaction but also a key factor in the transformation of social, cultural, and epistemological space. Digital culture reshapes not merely the technical means of information transmission, but the very nature of the communicative act, representation, and interpretation. In this context, there arises the need for a philosophical reflection on how algorithmic mediation, the «semiotics of surface,» and the loss of context affect the ethics of dialogue, the structure of publicity, and the capacity for critical thought. The relevance of the topic is determined not only by the speed of technological change but also by the depth of the philosophical challenges that such change engenders.

Historiography. Within contemporary Ukrainian philosophical discourse, the problem of the loss of interpretation has become particularly acute. As demonstrated in the research of O. Dzoban¹, V. Voronkova, V. Nikitenko², L. Panchenko, N. Radionova, and others, digital communication increasingly functions as a system of navigational flows in which intentions dissolve into metadata and representation loses its connection with both context and subject. The digital age is an era in which we no longer read but scan. Within this context, it is useful to introduce the concept of the «algorithmic interpretant» – a technically generated reaction to a sign that does not presuppose hermeneutic understanding. Such an interpretant functions as the outcome of a computational operation, where meaning is replaced by classification and interpretation by navigation. This concept provides a framework for describing the mechanism of depth-loss in digital representation.

At the same time, despite the growing interest in media philosophy, digital ethics, and semiotics, most research has remained focused on the sociological, cultural, or technical aspects of digital communication. The philosophical foundations of this transformation – particularly the changing status of the sign, the interpretant, and intentionality – remain insufficiently examined.

A broader historiographical perspective shows that the problem of interpretation has deep roots in classical philosophical and semiotic traditions. C. S. Peirce's³ theory of semiosis conceptualised the interpretant as a dynamic element mediating between sign and understanding. J. Habermas⁴, in his theory of communicative action, linked interpretation to the conditions of rational discourse and mutual recognition.

M. Buber's⁵ philosophy of dialogue introduced the distinction between the *I-Thou* and *I-It* relations, which becomes especially relevant in digital environments where communication

¹ Дзьобан О. П. Цифрова людина як філософська проблема. *Інформація і право*. 2021. № 2(37). С. 9–19.

² Воронкова В. Г., Нікітенко В. О. Філософія цифрової людини і цифрового суспільства: теорія і практика: монографія. Львів–Торунь: Liha-Pres, 2022. 460 с.

³ Peirce C. S. The collected papers of Charles Sanders Peirce / ed. by C. Hartshorne, P. Weiss, A. W. Burks. Electronic edition. Charlottesville: InteLex Corporation, 1994.

⁴ Habermas J. *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1981. 633 s.

⁵ Buber M. *I and Thou* / trans. by W. Kaufmann. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970. 192 p.

increasingly shifts toward objectified, data-driven interactions. This shift illustrates how intentionality and subject – subject relations are transformed under algorithmic mediation.

In media philosophy, M. McLuhan and V. Flusser analysed how technical media reshape perception and communication. McLuhan's⁶ insight that media transform the structure of experience, and Flusser's⁷ notion of the *technical image* as a new mode of codifying reality, provide important foundations for understanding digital semiosis. J. Baudrillard's⁸ analysis of simulacra further illuminates how signs in contemporary media circulate independently of any referent, creating conditions in which representation becomes autonomous and interpretation loses depth. M. Castells⁹ conceptualised the network society as an environment organised through flows of information, where communication becomes embedded in algorithmic infrastructures.

Recent international scholarship has turned toward the ethical and epistemological implications of algorithmic mediation. S. Zuboff¹⁰ has examined the logic of surveillance capitalism and the extraction of behavioural data; T. Gillespie¹¹ has analysed platform governance and the role of algorithms in shaping visibility; L. Floridi¹² has developed an information ethics framework that rethinks agency and responsibility in digital environments; and J. Cheney-Lippold¹³ has shown how algorithmic processes construct «algorithmic identities,» redefining the relationship between subject and data. These approaches demonstrate that interpretation in digital environments is increasingly delegated to technical systems that classify, filter, and prioritise information.

Ukrainian research has also begun to address the specific challenges of digital communication under conditions of war, hybrid threats, and digital mobilisation. Studies in media literacy, information security, and the transformation of the public sphere highlight how algorithmic infrastructures influence civic agency, collective memory, and the dynamics of public discourse. However, despite these developments, the philosophical dimension of these transformations – particularly the semiotic and epistemological consequences of algorithmic mediation – remains under-theorised.

It is precisely within this theoretical gap that the concept of the *algorithmic interpretant* becomes relevant. It offers a way to conceptualise how digital communication produces reactions to signs without hermeneutic depth, how representation operates without referent, and how interpretation becomes a technical function rather than a human act of understanding. This framework allows for a more precise description of the mechanisms through which digital culture transforms the communicative space and reconfigures the conditions of meaning-making.

The Aim and the Subject of the article is to provide a philosophical reflection on the transformation of communicative space in the conditions of digital culture through the analysis of three interrelated levels: the communicative (the transformation of the ethics of dialogue), the semiotic (the transformation of the sign and representation), and the epistemological-ethical (critical thinking as a response to algorithmic mediation). The task consists in identifying structural shifts in the nature of communication, representation, and interpretation, as well as in formulating the philosophical foundations for their comprehension.

⁶ McLuhan M. *Understanding media: The extensions of man*. London: Routledge, 1964. 318 p.

⁷ Flusser V. *Into the universe of technical images*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011. 224 p.

⁸ Baudrillard J. *Simulacra and simulation* / trans. by S. F. Glaser. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994. 164 p.

⁹ Castells M. *The networked city: Réseaux, espace, société*. EspacesTemps.net, 2009.

¹⁰ Zuboff S. *The age of surveillance capitalism: The fight for a human future at the new frontier of power*. London: Profile Books, 2019. 704 p.

¹¹ Gillespie T. *Custodians of the Internet: Platforms, content moderation, and the hidden decisions that shape social media*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018. 296 p.

¹² Floridi L. *The ethics of information*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. 380 p.

¹³ Cheney-Lippold J. *We are data: Algorithms and the making of our digital selves*. New York: New York University Press, 2018. 320 p.

Methodologically, the study draws on hermeneutic analysis, phenomenological reconstruction of communicative experience, and critical reflection on the epistemological consequences of digital representation. Such an interdisciplinary approach makes it possible to integrate classical philosophical concepts with the contemporary challenges of digital culture.

The scientific novelty of the article lies in its proposal of a conceptual model for philosophically comprehending digital communication as a transformation not only of its technical but also of its ontological dimension. For the first time, the synthesis of the philosophy of communication, the semiotics of the technical image, and the ethics of critical thinking is undertaken within a unified theoretical field. This allows for a rethinking of the roles of the sign, the interpretant, and the subject in the digital age. Furthermore, the article introduces and conceptualises the phenomenon of the «algorithmic interpretant» – the mechanism through which algorithms perform interpretative functions within the digital semiosphere – while proposing a methodological synthesis of hermeneutics and the analysis of algorithmic infrastructures in order to restore ethical and epistemological responsibility in the digital public sphere.

Main material and results. Digital culture radically transforms the conditions of human communication, turning it from a process of mutual understanding into algorithmically mediated interaction. In classical philosophy of communication – from Martin Buber’s¹⁴ dialogical thought to Jürgen Habermas’s¹⁵ theory of communicative action – dialogue is understood as a space of intersubjective trust and ethical responsibility (Buber), as well as a procedure for achieving mutual understanding within the public sphere (Habermas).

Despite their differences of emphasis – the existential dimension in Buber and the rational-procedural in Habermas – both thinkers establish a foundation for understanding dialogue as a form of responsible communication. However, in the context of digital representation, these foundations undergo essential transformation: signs are replaced by data, intentions by metadata, and publicity by fragmented streams. This raises the need for philosophical reflection on whether communicative ethics can be preserved in an environment where algorithms determine not only access to information but also the very possibility of being heard.

If classical philosophy of communication interprets dialogue as an ethically grounded interaction between subjects, digital culture changes the very nature of the sign, transforming it from a bearer of meaning into an element of a computable structure. In semiotic terms, this means a shift from interpretation to processing, from meaning to function. As L. Manovich aptly notes: «... **we can theorize digital culture, we need to see it, and that, because of its scale, to see it we need computers**»¹⁶.

The sign no longer requires intention – it functions as part of an algorithmic chain that determines routes of attention, behaviour, and perception. Digital representation, with its metadata, tags, and filters, creates a new semiosphere in which interpretation gives way to navigation, and meaning to statistics.

The transformation of communicative ethics in the digital environment is not confined to the social or procedural aspects of dialogue – it touches upon the very nature of representation. Where classical philosophy of communication operated with meanings, intentions, and signs, digital culture introduces a new logic: the logic of data, metadata, and algorithms. This shift demands semiotic analysis: what happens to the sign when its function is defined not by interpretation but by computation?

In traditional semiotic models – from F. de Saussure to C. S. Peirce – the sign exists as a relation between signifier and signified, or as a triad: representamen, object, and interpretant. In the digital semiosphere, these structures are deformed: the representamen becomes code, the object becomes data, and the interpretant becomes an algorithmic filter. Meaning is replaced

¹⁴ Buber, 1970.

¹⁵ Habermas J. The theory of communicative action. Vol. 1: Reason and the rationalization of society / trans. by T. McCarthy. Boston: Beacon Press, 1986. 512 p.; Habermas J. The theory of communicative action. Vol. 2: Lifeworld and system: A critique of functionalist reason / trans. by T. McCarthy. Boston: Beacon Press, 1989. 466 p.

¹⁶ Manovich L. Cultural analytics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2020. 320 p. P. 28.

by relevance, interpretation by navigation. Digital representation no longer functions as an invitation to understanding, but as an interface for interaction, where meaning is what is clicked, liked, and circulated.

In the digital environment, the function of the interpretant – a key element of Peirce’s semiotic triangle¹⁷ – is increasingly performed not by a human subject but by an algorithm.

To delineate the analytical scope of the proposed concept, it is necessary to distinguish the *algorithmic interpretant* from several adjacent notions frequently used in digital studies. Although these terms describe related processes, they do not capture the semiotic transformation at the core of algorithmic mediation.

Term	What it means	How it differs from the algorithmic interpretant
Algorithmic governance	Behavioural control, optimisation, and prediction through algorithmic systems	Describes regulatory or managerial functions; does not concern the interpretation of signs
Automated moderation	Filtering, blocking, or ranking content according to technical rules	Does not generate new meanings; functions as a technical filter rather than an interpretant
Machine learning	A technical process of building models from data	An engineering mechanism, not a semiotic category; does not describe the relation between sign and interpretation
Algorithmic interpretant	An algorithmically generated response to a sign – classification, ranking, recommendation – that shapes the user’s subsequent interpretation	A semiotic category describing a new mode of meaning-production where interpretation is replaced by computation

This clarification positions the algorithmic interpretant not as a technical procedure but as a transformation of the semiotic relation itself: a shift from meaning to function, from interpretation to computation.

This theoretical shift becomes particularly evident when examined through the operational logic of contemporary digital platforms. These examples do not serve a descriptive purpose; rather, they demonstrate how computational systems generate reactions to signs without hermeneutic depth, thereby confirming the theoretical model developed above.

In TikTok’s recommendation loops, the system does not interpret content semantically. Instead, it registers micro-interactions – pauses, swipes, replays – and converts them into behavioural signals. The resulting «interpretation» is a technical output: the user is classified into behavioural clusters, and the feed is adjusted accordingly.

A similar mechanism operates in Google Search through personalised SERP ranking. Queries are not treated as linguistic acts embedded in context but as data points within a probabilistic model. The «interpretation» of a query becomes a ranking operation shaped by location, search history, device type, and aggregated behavioural profiles.

Instagram illustrates the logic of visual normalisation. The platform prioritises images that conform to statistically successful aesthetic patterns, producing an implicit interpretive framework that privileges certain visual forms.

Facebook/Meta demonstrates the logic of datafication, where behavioural patterns – likes, dwell time, interaction networks – are transformed into predictive categories. The system «interprets» the user not through meaning but through inferred traits and probabilities.

¹⁷ Peirce, 1994.

Taken together, these cases show that digital platforms do not interpret signs in the hermeneutic sense. Instead, they generate algorithmic interpretants – technical reactions that replace understanding with classification and representation with navigation. This implies that the process of interpreting a sign is no longer grounded in cultural context, intention, or the interpreter’s lived experience, but is defined by the technical logic of data processing. As the publisher’s annotation to Wendy Chun’s book aptly observes: «Polarization is a goal – not an error – within big data and machine learning»¹⁸.

The algorithm does not «understand» the sign; rather, it classifies, ranks, and correlates it with other elements of the system. Such a transformation calls into question the very possibility of philosophical semiotics as a discipline grounded in the semantic depth of the sign.

In this context, representation loses its hermeneutic character and assumes a functional one: it exists not for interpretation but for interaction. Image, text, and sound alike are transformed into interfaces designed to elicit reaction rather than understanding. A new epistemology of representation emerges, in which meaning is not what is signified but what is activated. As Davide Picca observes: «From a semiotic perspective, these intertextual recombinations are acts of sign reconfiguration. They do not produce «new» meanings ex nihilo, but recontextualize existing signs within alternate semiotic regimes. The result is a form of symbolic estrangement: canonical texts and philosophical doctrines are defamiliarized, revealing their constructedness and inviting users to interrogate their assumptions»¹⁹. The algorithm becomes not merely a technical mediator but an ontological participant in communication, reshaping the very structure of the semiotic field.

Within the digital semiosphere, representation increasingly loses its connection to context, which was central in classical models of interpretation. As shown in the studies of Viktoriya Yanovska and Tamara Nedoshovenko, contemporary media culture transforms symbols and narratives to create new forms of mass communication. Modern audiences, through digital media, are able to actively interpret and modify symbols, producing their own versions of narratives²⁰. Whereas the sign once functioned within a cultural, historical, or discursive system, digital representation exists as an autonomous surface-visual, interactive, yet devoid of depth. This shift from context to surface is not merely technical but also philosophical: it alters the very nature of meaning, transforming it into an effect of visibility.

Vilém Flusser, in his concept of the technical image, argued that photography, and later the digital image, does not represent the world but creates a new reality-programmable, calculable, and visually persuasive. Such an image requires no context, for it becomes context itself: it operates as an interface rather than a window onto the world²¹.

Jean Baudrillard, developing the idea of the simulacrum, demonstrates that representation in the digital age loses its connection to the referent and transforms into a self-sufficient system of signs that simulates reality without reality²². In this sense, digital culture produces not meanings but effects – not interpretation but reaction.

The loss of context in digital representation is not merely an aesthetic or technical issue, but a philosophical challenge: how are we to think about truth, ethics, and responsibility in an environment where the sign no longer points to anything beyond itself?

The transformation of communicative practices becomes especially visible in the Ukrainian context, where digital culture intersects with the realities of full-scale war. The algorithmisation of communication here acquires not only technical but existential significance: it shapes public mobilisation, information security, and the resilience of society.

¹⁸ Chun W. H. K. *Discriminating data: correlation, neighborhoods, and the new politics of recognition*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2021. 312 p.

¹⁹ D. Picca. *Not minds, but signs: reframing LLMs through semiotics: electronic article*. 2025. Pp. 1–21. doi:10.48550/arXiv.2505.17080 (accessed 21 March 2026). P. 13.

²⁰ Яновська В., Недошовенко Т. Семіотичний аспект трансформацій міфу в контексті сучасної медіакультури. *Народознавчі зошити*. 2024. № 6(180). С. 1604.

²¹ Flusser, 2011. 224 p.

²² Habermas, 1981. 633 s.

Digital platforms have become instruments of rapid coordination and civic participation. Services such as *Diia*, volunteer networks, and crowdfunding platforms demonstrate how algorithmic infrastructures enable large-scale collective action. At the same time, the logic of algorithmic moderation affects the visibility of war-related content: automated filters remove images of destruction, restrict documentation of war crimes, or downrank posts that do not conform to platform policies. This creates new epistemic vulnerabilities, as critical information may be suppressed not by political actors but by technical systems. The Ukrainian information space is also a target of algorithmically amplified disinformation campaigns. Coordinated inauthentic behaviour, bot networks, and micro-targeted propaganda exploit the same mechanisms of ranking and behavioural prediction that structure everyday digital communication. In this environment, the algorithmic interpretant becomes a site of contestation: it can either strengthen national resilience or be weaponised to undermine it. The Ukrainian case thus reveals the political and ethical stakes of algorithmic mediation. It demonstrates that the shift from interpretation to computation is not merely a cultural phenomenon but a factor that directly influences security, agency, and the capacity for collective action.

In a space where representation loses its context and the sign functions as a surface interface, critical thinking acquires the status not only of a cognitive tool but of an ethical stance. It becomes a form of resistance – the capacity not to submit to automated interpretation, not to mistake the simulacrum for reality, not to confuse reaction with meaning. In this sense, critical thinking is not simply a skill, but a mode of being in digital culture, one that requires sustained philosophical reflection.

The digital semiosphere, governed by algorithms, creates an illusion of transparency, accessibility, and neutrality. Yet it is precisely this illusion that becomes the source of epistemic vulnerability: the user does not perceive the structures that shape perception, nor recognise the logic of selection, ranking, and concealment. Critical thinking makes it possible to reclaim autonomy – not through rejecting the digital, but through interpreting it. It is a thinking that does not stop at the surface, but seeks to reconstruct context, expose mechanisms, and raise questions where ready-made answers are offered.

Thus, the philosophy of communication in the digital age cannot be confined to the analysis of technical changes; it must also encompass an ethics of interpretation, a semiotics of responsibility, and an ontology of thought that resists simulation.

Conclusions. The transformation of communicative space in the conditions of digital culture requires a rethinking of the key philosophical principles underlying dialogue, representation, and interpretation. Digital media alter not only the technical parameters of interaction but also the ontological structure of communication: algorithms displace intentions, surface replaces depth, and reaction supplants understanding. As Schäfer and van Es (2017) emphasise, the process of the «datafication» of cultural practices shifts the focus from hermeneutic interpretation to measurable indicators of interaction: what counts are reactions and circulation, rather than the depth of meaning²³.

In the semiotic dimension, this shift entails the transition from the sign as a bearer of meaning to the sign as an element of a computable system. Representation loses its context and assumes a functional character, which challenges traditional models of interpretation. The theories of Flusser and Baudrillard allow us to conceptualise this change as a move from hermeneutics to simulation, from meaning to effect.

Critical thinking, in this context, emerges as an ethical response to semiotic transformation. It preserves the autonomy of the subject, enables the reconstruction of context, and resists the surface logic of digital culture. Thus, the philosophy of communication in the digital era must integrate the semiotics of algorithms, the ethics of interpretation, and an ontology of thinking capable of discerning structure behind the interface and meaning beyond mere reaction.

²³ Schäfer M. T., van Es K. *The datafied society: studying culture through data*. London; New York: Routledge, 2017. 268 p.

Philosophical analysis of digital communication reveals the transformation not only of technical means of information transmission but also of the very nature of representation, interpretation, and publicity. In the digital environment, signs are increasingly replaced by data, intentions by metadata, and publicity by fragmented flows that function beyond context and beyond the subject. This transformation carries not only semiotic implications but also epistemological and ethical dimensions, as it calls into question the very capacity for critical thinking, dialogue, and responsible understanding.

In this regard, the philosophy of communication emerges as an instrument not only of theoretical analysis but also of ethical navigation within algorithmised culture. Critical thinking, interpretation, and contextualisation acquire the status of ethical resistance to superficiality, reactivity, and the erosion of meaning. Future research might be directed towards analysing the epistemological limits of algorithmised communication and its impact on humanities education, the public sphere, and the institutions of knowledge.

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