Richard Rorty’s neo-pragmatism in context problems of modern philosophy of science

Authors

  • Mariіa-­Kateryna Pavchuk Department of philosophy, Yuriy Fedkovych Chernivtsi National University, Chernivtsi, Ukraine

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.15421/272017

Abstract

This article examines the actualization of the philosophy of neopragmatism and its relationship with linguistic and analytical philosophy. The contribution to the pragmatic turn of philosophy examines how these different discursive strategies relate to each other and what their relevance to the relationship between pragmatism and philosophy in general is. Philosophy, according to Rorty, like culture in general, is not a search for truth, but a conversation and communication. The reorientation from knowledge and truth to conversation and communication could create a basis for the implementation of a new type of philosophy, built not on objectivity but on irony and solidarity.

The main positive of Rorty’s deconstructivist project is to stimulate philosophers from the camp of rationalists to improve the tools needed to solve new constructive problems. In the history of philosophy, this has always been the result of radical romantic criticism. Linguistic philosophy and neo-pragmatism turned out to be directions that, born within the scientific method of theorizing, turned out to be fully adapted to the synthesis of their ideas with the construction of currents, which are traditionally interpreted as anti-scientific.

This fully applies to the linguistic philosophy of L. Wittgenstein and his followers, to the neo-pragmatists W. Quine, D. Davidson, M. White, R. Rorty and others. Among modern researchers this topic was developed by A. F. Gryaznov, V. Y. Zharkikh, U. G. Truita, I. S. Dobronravova

Published

2020-12-09